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Abstract  
Recently, the practice of deciding legal cases on purely statistical evidence has been widely 
criticised. Many feel uncomfortable with finding someone guilty on the basis of bare probabilities, 
even though the chance of error might be stupendously small. This is an important issue: with the 
rise of DNA profiling, courts are increasingly faced with purely statistical evidence. A prominent 
line of argument—endorsed by Blome-Tillmann 2017; Smith 2018; and Littlejohn 2018—rejects 
the use of such evidence by appealing to epistemic norms that apply to individual inquirers.  My 
aim in this paper is to rehabilitate purely statistical evidence by arguing that, given the broader aims 
of legal systems, there are scenarios in which relying on such evidence is appropriate. Along the 
way I explain why popular arguments appealing to individual epistemic norms to reject legal 
reliance on bare statistics are unconvincing, by showing that courts and individuals face different 
epistemic predicaments (in short, individuals can hedge when confronted with statistical evidence, 
whilst legal tribunals cannot). I also correct some misconceptions about legal practice that have 
found their way into the recent literature. 
0. Overview  
Recently, the practice of deciding legal cases on purely statistical evidence has been widely criticised.2  
Many feel uncomfortable with finding someone guilty on the basis of bare probabilities, even though 
the chance of error might be stupendously small. This is an important issue: with the rise of DNA 
profiling, courts are increasingly faced with purely statistical evidence. In a series of prominent papers, 
various philosophers appeal to epistemic norms governing individual inquirers to argue that legal 
verdicts should never be based on statistical evidence alone. My project is to show that not only have 
recent discussions mischaracterised how the law actually treats purely statistical evidence, but also 
argue that there are cases in which relying on such evidence is justifiable. In developing these claims, I 
demonstrate why we cannot solve jurisprudential questions by simply appealing to the norms found in 
theorising about individual epistemic agents.  Rather, settling issues of legal theory requires us to look 
further afield, taking into the account the unique tasks and challenges that face legal systems.3  
This argument will be developed over five sections. In §1, I present the intuitive case against purely 
statistical evidence, explain why it creates a jurisprudential puzzle, and separate out different responses 
to this puzzle. In §2, I introduce key concepts of evidence law necessary to fully appreciate legal 
treatment of statistical evidence. In §3, I demonstrate why DNA profiling is properly characterised as 
statistical evidence before showing that—contrary to recent assertions—legal systems do not generally 
prohibit basing verdicts on bare statistics. In §4, I introduce and reject a range of arguments against the 
use of purely statistical evidence which appeal to epistemic norms that govern individual inquirers. 
These arguments overlook the fact that individuals, unlike courts, can hedge in response to statistics.  
Finally, in §5, I suggest that our qualms about purely statistical evidence stem from the fact that it makes 
the possibility of error salient. However, because managing the possibility of error in different contexts 
                                                          
1 Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Please cite the published version!  
2  For an overview see: Gardiner (2018). For specific arguments, Smith (2018) Littlejohn (2018) Blome-Tillman 
(2015; 2017) Di Bello (forthcoming) Thomson (1986) Enoch et al (2012) provide representative examples.  
3 This paper focuses on the common law and will not discuss civil law traditions. However much of what I say is 
relevant to any legal system.   
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is a delicate yet necessary task that every fallible legal system must fulfil, I close by arguing that the 
best solution to the puzzle of statistical evidence takes each case on its individual merits, rather than 
entertaining any general prohibition against such evidence. One upshot is that we might reasonably 
convict in cases involving DNA evidence but not in some of the other cases that have particularly 
discomfited critics of statistical evidence.  
1. The puzzle of purely statistical evidence  
Below are two cases—taken from the criminal and civil domain respectively—standardly used to 
motivate the idea that there is something amiss about legal reliance on purely statistical evidence. (I’ll 
sometimes call it ‘PSE’ for short).4  
PRISONERS: 100 prisoners are exercising in the prison yard. 99 of them attack the guard, 
putting into action a plan that the 100th prisoner knew nothing about. The 100th prisoner 
played no role in the assault and could have done nothing to stop it. There is no further 
information that we can use to settle the question of any particular prisoner’s involvement.5 
BLUE BUS: A bus causes injury to a pedestrian, but it is not known which company the bus 
belongs to. On the route where the accident occurred, the Blue Bus Company runs 75% of 
the buses. There is no further information that we can use to settle the question of which 
company the bus belongs to.  
Many have the intuition that it would not be permissible to sanction in these cases. In the 
psychological literature, this phenomenon is called the ‘Wells’ effect’ after an influential study of juror 
reluctance to assign liability on the basis of bare statistics.6 These patterns of intuition give rise to the 
puzzle of purely statistical evidence because, given what we know about the fallibility of other types of 
evidence such as eye-witness testimony, statistical evidence will often be more truth-conducive than 
other sorts of evidence on which we routinely base legal verdicts. The issue, then, is the following: how 
concerned should we be about the intuitive reluctance many have about basing legal verdicts on PSE? 
Should we accept these intuitions and construct theories that vindicate them, or should we ignore them 
and focus on the fact that such evidence can be very reliable?   
Schematically, there are three different approaches to PSE. (In the following, what counts as ‘strong’ 
probabilistic support will vary depending on the standard of proof being used).  
Always:   It is always acceptable to base a legal decision on purely statistical evidence, so 
long as it provides strong probabilistic support to that verdict.  
Sometimes:  Sometimes it is acceptable to base a legal decision on purely statistical evidence 
when it provides strong probabilistic support to that verdict.   
Never:  It is always wrong to base a legal decision on purely statistical evidence even when 
it provides strong probabilistic support to that verdict. 
We should hold at the outset that Always is incorrect. In some scenarios, there are specific moral reasons 
to avoid appealing to statistics in legal inquiry. One example might be the use of crime statistics about 
certain demographics. For instance, even if it were the case that 99.9% of all game console thefts were 
carried out by women, this shouldn’t be enough to convict some individual woman if, for example, a 
games console is stolen in a situation where only one man or one woman could have been involved. 
                                                          
4 Here, and throughout, evidence is used in the sense familiar to the legal system rather than as a philosophers’ 
term of art. Thus, evidence refers to that which is adduced in the context of a trial to support or rebut some 
contention. It does not refer to any doxastic or epistemic state.  
5 Wording taken from Redmayne (2008).  
6 See Wells (1992).  
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The repeated use of such statistics would, I suggest, amount to an oppressive pattern against certain 
demographic groups.7 However, even though the use of statistics can constitute oppression in some 
cases, this worry does not generalise. For instance, in PRISONERS, a group of prisoners who happen 
to be exercising at the time of collective disorder does not constitute a stable demographic group. This 
suggests that there are different strategies for vindicating the intuitions we have about PSE cases.  
One approach is to identify specific features of certain cases to explain why those particular types 
of case should not be settled by purely statistical evidence. For instance, one worry about PRISONERS 
might be that, if all 100 prisoners were captured, we would knowingly convict one of them wrongly. A 
rather different approach is to argue that generic features of all PSE cases mean that such evidence is 
not a fitting basis for a legal decision in general. The latter approach has been the most popular strategy, 
and has been used to motivate Never. This view will be my target—I do not think that the generic 
features shared in common by PSE cases suffices to justify a general prohibition against relying on bare 
statistics. In this sense, we should not draw an inference from our aversion to some cases involving PSE 
to every case involving PSE. Rather, in this paper, I will be advocating for Sometimes by arguing that 
different uses of PSE invoke different issues. On balance, sometimes we should allow that a legal 
decision can be based on purely statistical evidence. Furthermore, I will claim that these cases are 
relatively common in the law.  
2. Evidence law: essential concepts  
Before getting into the weeds, we must first briefly introduce three key concepts of evidence law: the 
Standard of Proof; the Evidential Burden; and Evidential Admissibility. Extant discussions have tended 
to be light on legal details, only focusing on the first of these. However, a cursory appreciation of other 
aspects of evidence law is essential to correctly understand the current place of statistical evidence in 
the law and ask normative questions about what its proper role should be.  
2.1 The Standard of Proof  
A central part of evidence law—familiar to most readers and well-trodden in recent philosophical 
literature—is the Standard of Proof (‘SoP’).  
The SoP is the standard applied to determine whether a body of evidence provides strong enough 
support to render a specified legal (or quasilegal) judgement appropriate. There are various different 
SoPs which apply to different types of legal judgement. Everyone knows the ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ (‘BRD’) standard that applies to verdicts in criminal cases. Most academics will also recognise 
the ‘balance of probabilities’ (‘BoP’) standard that applies to verdicts in civil cases (e.g. contractual 
disputes). BRD and BoP are not the only standards found in legal systems. Various other formulations 
are adopted by different (quasi)legal institutions for various purposes, imposing more and less exacting 
standards.8 SoPs often apply outside the context of trial verdicts; for example, prosecutors are governed 
by a SoP when deciding whether to charge a suspect with a crime. The way in which different standards 
of proof have been formulated and interpreted has changed significantly over time.9 For instance, the 
standard for criminal conviction was once glossed as ‘moral certainty’, a fallibilist contrast to the notion 
of ‘mathematical’ or ‘metaphysical’ certainty that is immune to sceptical doubt. The way in which 
                                                          
7 See Mogensen (forthcoming) on how racial profiling can constitute oppression. There is a growing literature on 
what we should think about such demographically targeted statistics. An important debate is whether forming 
beliefs on the basis of racial profiling is a moral wrong (see e.g. Basu forthcoming), an epistemic wrong (see e.g. 
Bolinger forthcoming) or something else. Here, I will be leaving this debate aside—I will be not be dealing with 
examples of statistical evidence that targets any particular demographic group.  
8 E.g. ‘reasonable suspicion’ (often governing police searches) and ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ (used to 
assess UK asylum claims) are standards less demanding than the BoP. Other standards—e.g. ‘clear and convincing 
evidence’ (sometimes used in civil cases regarding children’s welfare or psychiatric assessment) fall between the 
civil and criminal standards. 
9 See Laudan (2006) and Roth (2010) for discussion.  
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current standards have been interpreted has also seen significant variation—for instance, attempts to 
clarify the BRD by quantification (e.g. a .95 credence) or by conflating it with the standards used in 
non-legal inquiry (e.g. the standards used to make an important decision in one’s life)  have waxed and 
waned in popularity over time.  
To be explicit about how these standards work: the BRD standard, for example, dictates that ‘a court 
should only issue a finding of criminal guilt iff the entirety of the evidence adduced supports the guilt 
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt!’ Judging whether or not a body of evidence meets the 
applicable SoP is left to the relevant fact-finder. In the context of a trial verdict, the fact-finder will be 
a judge or a jury. Deciding whether evidence meets the SoP is not a technical judgement in the sense of 
requiring the fact-finder to interpret the law. Rather, the role of the fact-finder is to use their everyday 
facility in discerning the plausible from the implausible to make a judgement about a body of evidence 
which they have had the opportunity to consider first-hand. Fact-finders, so long as they stay with 
bounds of reasonableness, have a broad discretion in judging whether or not the evidence meets the 
relevant SoP.10 
2.2 Sufficient evidence: discharging the ‘evidential burden’ 
A widely overlooked yet crucial legal concept is that of leading sufficient evidence and discharging the 
evidential burden.  
In contrast to the non-technical task of the fact-finder to decide whether a body of evidence meets 
whatever SoP is in play, the doctrine of sufficient evidence is a matter of law regulated by the judge. 
(Note: judges can be both legal arbiters and fact-finders—these are distinct roles).11 The doctrine of 
sufficient evidence places a legal burden—often called the ‘evidential burden’—on the party aiming to 
establish some claim. This burden acts like a filter that weeds out unacceptably weak cases. Specifically, 
it means that the party aiming to establish some contention must adduce sufficient evidence in favour 
of that claim before it can legitimately be put to the fact-finder (who will then, taking into account all 
of the evidence, decide whether enough has been done to prove the contention on the relevant standard 
of proof).12 For instance, a very minimal construal of sufficient evidence in the context of a criminal 
case is that some evidence must be adduced which: (i) suggests that a crime has been committed, and 
(ii) suggests that the accused in the perpetrator. If this burden is not discharged, then the court does not 
move into the deliberative stage of considering the evidence against the relevant SoP. For instance, to 
continue using criminal procedure as an example, a failure to discharge the evidential burden will force 
the judge to hold that the accused has ‘no case to answer’ and bring proceedings to a close. Some 
jurisdictions have more heavyweight conceptions of sufficient evidence than others. One rationale for 
stricter conceptions is to mitigate the possibility of miscarriages of justice by imposing more judicial 
oversight on cases before they are left to the jury.13  
Crucially, sufficiency of evidence not about the quality of evidence. The conditions under which 
evidence counts as sufficient is a technical matter of law for the judge to decide, whilst quality of 
                                                          
10 This is why appellate courts are reluctant to overturn first-instance judgements about whether the evidence 
satisfies the SoP solely on the grounds that the appellate court disagrees with the original judgement. 
11 To illustrate: in a criminal jury trial the judge will be the legal arbiter but not the fact-finder. In a non-jury 
criminal case, the judge will be the legal arbiter throughout the trial and then play the role of the fact-finder in 
deciding whether or not the accused is guilty.  
12 There are differences in how the burden to prove facts are allocated in criminal and civil trials, but these nuances 
need not detain us for our purposes.  
13 An interesting example is found in the Scots’ law requirement of corroboration: in Scottish criminal trials, 
crucial facts must be corroborated by at least two independent sources of evidence to discharge the evidential 
burden. This further exemplifies the distinction between sufficiency of evidence and the SoP; e.g. one might 
suppose that one individual source of evidence (e.g. an eyewitness account) could conceivably establish guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but due to lack of corroboration this—in a Scottish criminal trial—might fail to 
constitute sufficient evidence.  
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evidence is a matter for the fact-finder. For example, it might happen that the prosecution in a criminal 
case adduces evidence that is rightly put the jury, only for the jury to rationally find the evidence 
unpersuasive. This is entirely consistent; sufficiency of evidence in a criminal jury trial concerns 
whether enough evidence has been adduced to warrant putting the case to the jury in the first place, not 
whether enough has been done, ultima facie, to persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  
2.3 Admissibility of evidence    
A third concept of evidence law will be familiar to readers so we need only introduce it very briefly. 
This is the idea of evidential admissibility. Rules governing admissibility determine when certain types 
of otherwise relevant evidence must, as a technical matter of law, be excluded. There are a variety of 
different rationales behind different rules: for example, some rules are in place to discourage 
improprieties at other stages of the judicial process (for example, prohibiting evidence acquired using 
coercion during police interview) whilst other rules preclude evidence that is perceived as unreliable or 
irrelevant (for example, well-known rules about hearsay evidence).  
When evidence should be excluded is a matter of law, determined by the judge. Evidence that is 
ruled inadmissible and excluded does not count towards discharging the evidential burden, and is not 
considered by the fact-finder in determining whether or not the applicable SoP has been met.  
 
3. Statistical evidence in the law: a closer look  
Recent discussions create the impression that legal systems are generally adverse to purely statistical 
evidence. One influential paper asserts outright that such evidence is inadmissible.14 Other philosophers 
do not locate the problem in admissibility, but nonetheless suggest that evidence law is unfavourable to 
bare statistics.15 These are empirical assertions about the common law. Not only are they interesting in 
their own right, but, if they were true, they would lend credence to certain normative views. This is 
because it would suggest that Never is the orthodox position and imply that those hostile to PSE are 
simply seeking to vindicate rather than revise existing legal practice. (Indeed, Blome-Tillmann 2017 
calls wholesale antipathy to PSE in the law conservative and opposing views revisionist).  
Against this characterisation I show that close inspection reveals no general prohibition against PSE 
in the law. Rather, the rise of cases involving DNA profiling show that PSE is playing an ever more 
prominent role. Furthermore, brief reflection will show that the most promising way to reject PSE 
appeals to the idea of sufficient evidence rather than, as some have suggested, a rule of admissibility.  
3.1 DNA evidence is statistical evidence  
In recent years the vast majority of reported legal cases involving PSE use DNA profiling. As such, it 
is necessary to say something about DNA evidence and why it is properly regarded as statistical.  
Everyone knows that courts—particularly criminal courts—consider DNA evidence: but what is the 
nature of this evidence and how is it presented to the court? DNA evidence comes from extracting, 
analysing, and making statistical inferences from genetic material. A typical case is where such material 
(e.g. saliva, hair, semen) is found at a crime-scene—for instance, investigators finding a cigarette-butt 
containing saliva at the site of a break-in. This genetic material is processed in a laboratory to build a 
profile of which alleles—the genes we inherit from our parents—appear at which locations on a strand 
of DNA. From this process, DNA evidence is used in different contexts. One is where suspicion has 
                                                          
14  See Enoch et al (2012: 198). Moreover, Blome-Tillmann (2017) suggests that such evidence should be 
inadmissible in defending what he views as a ‘conservative’ position on evidence law.  
15 For instance, see Smith (2018), Gardiner (2018), Di Bello (forthcoming) for a selection of those who claim that 
using PSE would be legally revisionary.  
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already fallen upon some person and DNA profiling is used to bolster the case against them. This might 
involve taking further genetic material from a suspect—e.g. with a saliva swab—and testing it against 
the initial genetic material found at a crime scene. If the samples match, this further supports the pre-
existing suspicion. A second use of genetic material, the use that we will primarily be concerned with, 
is so-called ‘cold-hit’ DNA evidence. In such cases genetic material (e.g. taken from the scene of a 
crime) is found to bear similarity to a DNA profile already held on file for some other reason. This 
evidence is then used as the basis of a criminal case against the person to whom the matching DNA 
profile belongs. In a cold-hit case, this person is not someone upon whom suspicion has independently 
fallen.   
DNA evidence is presented to the court in the form of expert testimony. An expert witness, often a 
forensic scientist with a doctoral degree, is called to court to testify to the significance of the DNA 
evidence. In a cold-hit case, the most important element of the testimony concerns an estimated 
statistical frequency of the allele-configuration in a given target population: for example, here is Dr 
Clara O’Sullivan providing the key piece of inculpatory evidence in a recent high profile cold-hit DNA 
case:  
Expert Witness: “We give an estimation of the chance of somebody randomly unrelated in the 
population, having the same profile, given that [the suspect has] the profile, is one in a thousand 
million.” [Wilson v DPP 2017 IESC 54 at 5.18] 
In this sense, DNA evidence is statistical evidence: on the assumption that the genetic material taken 
from the crime-scene belongs to the person who committed the crime, the incriminating component of 
the DNA evidence is that it is exceptionally unlikely that the genetic material does not belong to the 
person being accused of the crime.16,17 When there is no additional evidence apart from the statistical 
estimate based on the DNA profile—as was the case in Wilson—we have a case involving purely 
statistical evidence. With this in mind, we can return to consider how the law treats PSE.   
3.2 Purely statistical evidence in the law  
There has been some confusion in the philosophical literature regarding statistical evidence in the law. 
One mistaken suggestion is that statistical evidence is generally inadmissible. If it were, we wouldn’t 
ever see criminal convictions relying on DNA evidence.  Indeed, if statistical evidence were 
inadmissible, then it would be treated like other types of inadmissible evidence—such as evidence 
obtained through torture—i.e. it would not be found even in conjunction with non-statistical evidence.18 
This is clearly not the case: courts take statistical evidence into account all the time, on a range of 
different subject-matters. Of course, there might be particular cases in which certain types of statistical 
evidence are inadmissible—such as evidence pertaining to demographic crime-statistics—but this does 
not mean that statistical evidence is generally inadmissible.19  These points are neatly exemplified by a 
quote from the very same case we drew the example of expert testimony from earlier. The judges in 
                                                          
16 It is worth pointing out that even critics of PSE do not tend to argue that DNA evidence is non-statistical.  
17 To be explicit, the probability of error being testified to by the expert witness concerns the possibility of there 
being a random match in the target population who shares the relevant DNA characteristics as the sample, but 
was not involved in the relevant incident. Such estimates do not include other possibilities of error like the DNA 
sample being corrupted due to cross-contamination or laboratory mistakes.  
18 See R. v Alan James Doheny; R. v Gary Adams (together) [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 369 for general rules on 
admitting DNA evidence. 
19  For instance, some cite United States v Shonubi 103, F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1997) in support of the inadmissibility 
of statistical evidence. However, this case clearly only concerns a very specific practice: punishing someone by 
using an estimate of contraband they have smuggled over time via a statistical evaluation of the habits of other 
smugglers. It does not follow that appellate courts disapprove of PSE in general just because they view such 
speculative sentencing as iniquitous. 
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this case, drawing on a range of common-law authorities from different legal systems, stressed the 
following about Dr O’Sullivan’s statistical testimony:   
[I]t is appropriate to emphasise that the Court is not here concerned with the admissibility of such 
evidence. Clearly even evidence of a tangential connection may be relevant in the overall context of a 
particular case but would be unlikely to provide sufficient evidence, without more, to allow for a safe 
conviction. [Ibid. at 5.5] 
As this quote suggests, the salient issue is whether PSE can discharge the evidential burden of 
providing legally sufficient evidence. Evidence can be admissible without being legally sufficient. A 
prosecutor can lead evidence that the accused owns a set of kitchen knives. Whilst admissible, this 
evidence would not be sufficient by itself to support a murder conviction.  
So, have courts typically held that PSE can discharge the evidential burden? In Wilson, the judges 
answered in the affirmative. Indeed, if we focus on PSE in the form of criminal cases relying on DNA 
evidence alone, then there are now numerous examples of courts affirming the sufficiency of such 
evidence to undergird a conviction.20 This is not to say that the sufficiency of PSE is an entirely 
uncontroversial matter.21 However, it is important not to overplay the extent of the controversy. One 
mistake to avoid is citing any case in which a verdict based on purely statistical evidence is overturned 
as supporting the claim that legal practice generally eschews PSE. For instance, R v. Watters22 is often 
cited as exemplifying the reluctance of the courts to rely on bare statistics. However, if one attends to 
the details of the judgement, the problem was not with statistical evidence per se, but rather with the 
fact that it failed to rule out the accused’s brother being responsible—and this was a possibility that had 
been raised by the defence. Indeed, the judges in Watters (at 21 per LJ Kay) are at pains to emphasise 
“we are not for one moment saying that merely because there was no other evidence … that this appeal 
has to be allowed”.  
It is true that one can find cases where the courts express hostility towards PSE, especially when we 
move away from DNA profiling. The case of Virginia & S.W. Ry. Co. v Hawk in the civil domain—
involving statistics about railway accidents—is a good example. However, other cases such as 
Kaminsky v Hertz Corp—superficially very similar to the BLUE BUS case as it involved ascribing 
liability on the basis of the percentage of vehicles owned by a particular company—where judges seem 
entirely amenable to purely statistical evidence. My own view is that such cases are not aspiring to be 
binding precedents about the standing of PSE in general, to hold for each and every case. Rather, they 
attend to specific details of the case at hand in making their judgement.23 This is often how the common 
law develops: it proceeds in a piecemeal fashion by drawing fine distinctions between preceding cases 
as justice demands in the case at hand. However, getting into the details of legal interpretation is 
unnecessary to make the following broader point about the sufficiency of PSE: as the rise of DNA 
                                                          
20 For a selection, see: R v. Hanratty [2002] 2 Cr. App. R. 30 (esp. comments at 127); R v Adams (no1) [1996] 2 
Cr. App. R. 467 and R v Adams (no2) [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. 377; R v Weir [2000] 5 WLUK 751; State v Toomes 
191  S.W.3d  122, 129 (Tenn.  Crim.  App.  2005); State v Hunter 861 N.E.2d 898 901; State v Davis 698 N.W.2d 
823, 826-27. Also see Director of Public Prosecutions v. Connolly [2011] IESC 6 (which, although dismissed for 
other reasons, affirms the sufficiency of PSE in the form of a forensic scientist analysing packages containing 
amphetamine). Beyond these citations, Roth (2010) is a legal scholar who discusses a variety of cases in more 
detail than I have space for here. Further, in Toomes the judges cite a number of other historical cases in support 
of the sufficiency of statistical evidence, for the interested reader. It is also worth noting that many uses of cold-
hit DNA leading to conviction go unreported, in particular cases in which the suspect pleads guilty.  
21 R v. Lashley [2000] EWCA 88 is an example of a DNA case being rejected on the basis that five or six people 
in the UK might fit the DNA profile. This doesn’t support a general rule against the sufficiency of DNA 
evidence however: often the probabilities involved in DNA cases make error even less likely than in Lashley. 
22 [2000 WL 1791491] 
23 For instance, it seems a better interpretation that Virginia concerns how juries should be directed in relation to 
probabilities: particularly, they should not be left to make probabilistic conjectures. Kaminsky¸ on the other hand, 
places weight on defeasible presumption created by the appearance of the truck and the unique demands of justice 
applicable to the law surrounding motor vehicles. Neither is a general endorsement or prohibition on PSE.  
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profiling shows, PSE is not insufficient evidence in general even though there may be individual cases 
in which the courts express reluctance to rely on it.  
I have attempted to set the record straight on how PSE is treated in the law. This serves a number of 
purposes. Beyond the simple motivation of striving for accuracy, showing that PSE is currently used in 
the law rebuts the thought that there is universal distaste for PSE that philosophers merely have to 
vindicate. Rather, especially given the prevalence of DNA evidence, the proper status of PSE is a live 
question that we should consider with an open mind. Moreover, our discussion also allows us to sketch 
a sympathetic proposal on behalf of critics as to how their critique should be implemented.  We should 
assume that critics of PSE are ill-served by suggesting that statistical evidence should be inadmissible. 
This would rule out using DNA evidence in any context, whilst also excluding statistical evidence when 
lead in conjunction with other types of evidence.  I take it that this position is unappealing—there is 
little reason to suppose that statistical evidence has no role to play in legal decision-making.  Rather, it 
is much more promising to interpret critics of PSE as arguing that our best evidence law should hold 
that: statistical evidence alone cannot constitute legally sufficient evidence to undergird a criminal 
conviction or finding of civil liability.24 Under this approach, if the party with the burden of proof 
adduced only statistical evidence then the fact-finder (such as the jury) would not be asked to 
deliberate—rather, the case would be thrown out. This seems like the most plausible interpretation of 
how critics could have their proposal implemented by common law legal systems. Of course, as we 
have shown, such a proposal would be rather revisionary: in particular, it would disallow criminal 
convictions based solely on DNA evidence.  
4. Doxastic approaches 
The foregoing empirical facts about legal practice still leave the normative question open: should there 
be a blanket prohibition on bare statistics carrying the day in court? A number of philosophers provide 
an affirmative answer, seeking to identify features shared by all PSE cases that justify rejecting them. 
This section argues against three different approaches in this vein.   
4.1 Three arguments against purely statistical evidence    
A prominent line of thought—recently endorsed by Smith 2018; Littlejohn 2018; and Blome-Tillmann 
2017—proposes to explain and vindicate the intuitions against PSE by appealing to the epistemic norms 
that apply to individual inquirers.25   
Before looking at the specifics, we’ll need some brief background theory. In epistemology there is 
an ongoing debate about how individuals should treat purely statistical evidence, best exemplified by 
preoccupation with lottery cases. Many suggest that there is an important normative asymmetry between 
statistical evidence and other types of evidence (such as direct sensory apprehension). For instance, 
some theories claim that relying on statistical evidence doesn’t yield knowledge. Taking a concrete 
example, a dominant thought has been that no matter the size of a fair lottery, one cannot know that one 
has a losing ticket just on the basis of it being very likely.26 Other theorists suggest that basing beliefs 
on purely statistical evidence leads to the absence of other normative properties, such as certain types 
of justification.27 This concern with statistical evidence is one front in a broader dispute about which 
normative property should be central to the epistemic lives of individual inquirers. For instance, some 
                                                          
24 Given that many juries (in the cases cited previously) have found PSE to satisfy the relevant SoP, it is also 
unappealing to suggest that it is a conceptual truth about any particular standard that it cannot be satisfied by 
statistics alone.  
25 These three support this view most explicitly. But it is also at least suggested by Enoch et al (2012); Bolinger 
(forthcoming); Pritchard (2015); and Buchak (2014).  
26 Most prominently, see Williamson (2000). This thought has also been supported by empirical survey data (see 
Ebert et al. 2018). See Hawthorne (2003) for discussion.  
27 See Sutton (2007), Smithies (2002), or Smith (2016); each focus on lottery cases.  
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endorse the idea that statistical evidence does not yield knowledge apiece with a more general view 
according to which knowledge determines when it is appropriate for someone to act upon a belief, to 
make an assertion, or even to hold a belief in the first place.  
A number of philosophers have used ideas from epistemic theories concerning individual inquirers 
to argue against relying on purely statistical evidence in the law.  
 
Blome-Tillmann’s argument  
Firstly, Michael Blome-Tillmann appeals to the idea that knowledge is the norm of action.  
Assuming that we ought to act on p only if we know p, the ideal and strongest epistemic state a court 
could be in, from a normative point of view, is one in which the court knows the defendant is at fault. 
[Blome-Tillmann 2017: 284] 
However, accepting that requiring knowledge is an unreasonable legal standard, Blome-Tillmann 
endorses an alternative view on which the probability of possessing knowledge is what matters:  
Courts need to be able to make decisions in the absence of the epistemically normative ideal—that is, 
in the absence of knowledge that the defendant is at fault. What is needed is a measure of gradual 
approximation to the normative ideal. One way to measure such approximation is in terms of evidential 
probabilities that one knows that the defendant is at fault. Knowledge then remains the normatively 
ideal state, but epistemic success in courts of law can be measured and understood in terms of 
something less than knowledge—namely, the evidential probability that knowledge has been achieved. 
[Ibid.]  
On this basis, Blome-Tillmann suggests that there should be a rule on which the SoP can only be 
satisfied by evidence that raises the probability that the conclusion is known above a certain threshold 
(e.g. >.5 for the civil BoP standard). As, ex hypothesi, statistical evidence by itself cannot yield 
knowledge, PSE cases will not meet this threshold.  
Smith’s argument  
Martin Smith’s argument requires a brief theoretical preface.  
In his work on individual inquirers, Smith (2016) developed a concept of justification featuring a 
notion he calls normic support. Normic support can be introduced with the idea of something ‘calling 
for explanation’.28 According to this theory, you are normically justified in holding some belief p only 
if the falsity of p, given your evidence, would call for some special explanation. So, while it might be 
very unlikely that I have won the lottery based on probability alone, it wouldn’t be abnormal for me to 
win in the sense of calling for some special explanation; thus, my belief that I have lost would not be 
normically supported. On the other hand, were I to look at my ticket and see that the numbers don’t 
match the winning numbers, then my belief that I have lost would be normically supported: some special 
explanation would be called for, were I to be mistaken.  
Smith observes that the puzzle of statistical evidence in the law can be explained by noting that the 
body of evidence involved fails to normically support the fault of the defendant. He then derives a 
normative claim from that observation:  
 [O]ur judgments about the presence or absence of normic support track our judgments about whether 
an affirmative legal verdict would be acceptable or unacceptable. What I suggest is a standard of proof 
that is met only if a proposition is normically supported by the evidence – only if the evidence makes 
the falsity of that proposition less normal, in the sense of calling for more explanation, than its truth. 
                                                          
28 The formal version of Smith’s theory appeals to a world-ranking framework, details of which can be found in 
his (2016). 
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What I suggest is that a verdict of guilt or liability is only acceptable in so far as this normic standard 
is met. This is my proposed solution to the legal puzzle of statistical evidence. [Smith 2018: 1209-
1210] 
Littlejohn’s argument  
Littlejohn holds that the reasonableness of a belief should be judged against the standard of acquiring 
knowledge, something that purely statistical evidence cannot yield. With this in mind, he endorses the 
following principle:  
Reasonable Conviction: It is not permissible to punish a defendant if it isn’t reasonable to believe 
the defendant to be guilty. [Littlejohn 2018: 15] 
Littlejohn defends this principle primarily by appealing to considerations of legitimate punishment:  
My defense of Reasonable Conviction begins with a reminder that punishment is an act that differs in 
an important way from acts like betting on football matches. This is because punishment is supposed 
to be a way of holding someone accountable and it involves a backwards-looking element that other 
actions often lack. Thus, the act in question (e.g. imposing a prison sentence) has to be guided by 
certain kinds of considerations to be a punishment. […] If we have a system of rules that governs 
decisions to punish or to refrain from punishing, it would seem that the rules should require that the 
decision to impose the harms associated with punishment be made only when the punishment can 
properly express blame or at least treat the defendant as accountable for some specific deed. It would 
not be proper to blame unless the relevant parties could properly believe that the defendant did 
something blameworthy. [Ibid 16-17] 
Littlejohn (s.8) expands on this suggestion by claiming that there are reactive attitudes and emotions 
associated with blame which can be rationalised by outright belief but not by a high degree of 
confidence that the subject of blame has transgressed.  
4.2 Against doxastic approaches 
Each of these arguments takes its cue from individual epistemology. Blome-Tillmann transposes to the 
law a theory about when it is rational for an individual to act. Smith applies to the legal domain his 
notion of epistemic justification which concerns when it is rational for an individual to believe 
something. And Littlejohn stakes out a position on when legal punishment is legitimate by appealing to 
the normative role of outright belief in licensing an individual to hold reactive attitudes associated with 
blame.  
For what follows, I will call views fitting this mould doxastic approaches because they take their 
cue from the norms surrounding belief in individual inquirers. Doxastic approaches are favourable to 
Never. This is because, on doxastic views, relying on purely statistical evidence can never fulfil certain 
requirements: such as providing knowledge, rationalising action, legitimising blame, and/or providing 
normic support for some proposition. As such, their arguments do not rest on details of particular cases 
but rather appeal to generic facts about the epistemic power of purely statistical evidence. Given that 
the three arguments outlined each claim that courts should conform to the same normative standards as 
individuals when confronted with PSE, one way to object to them would take issue with how they 
characterise the norms governing individuals. I won’t take this approach here. Rather, let’s grant 
whichever epistemic view critics prefer; my argument will attack the purported normative symmetry 
between doxastic and legal norms.  
Let’s start with an observation: in an ideal scenario, when a court issues a judgement—e.g. that 
Harry killed Sally, or that Jim’s hedge is encroaching Jules’ property—it would be one that an individual 
inquirer could cheerfully believe outright on the evidence. This is because, in a perfect world, the 
evidence would always support the legal verdict without leaving any room for doubt or uncertainty. 
Thus, courts would only ever judge—and, act, blame and punish—when the evidence was strong 
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enough to support an individual inquirer believing outright (or knowing) that the relevant party is at 
fault or not at fault. We do not exist in this ideal world. The reality is that courts are routinely faced 
with bodies of evidence that are difficult to evaluate and fail to unequivocally vindicate either side. This 
is why, for instance, courts cannot simply ask the fact-finder to look at the evidence and then report 
whether they believe outright that (i) the defending party is at fault, or (ii) the defending party is not at 
fault.29 Such an approach would be a recipe for paralysis. Take a civil case where the evidence only 
weakly suggests that a given party has been negligent; this will not be enough to support an individual 
believing outright that the relevant party either is, or is not, civilly liable. Nonetheless, it is incumbent 
on a tribunal to decide one way or the other. This is why legal tribunals have rules to ensure that they 
operate in a thoroughly binary fashion—something is treated as having occurred or not, an accused is 
judged guilty or not guilty, a defending party is deemed civilly liable or they are not.  
Lord Hoffman, in an influential case on proof, puts it succinctly:  
If a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a “fact in issue”), a judge or jury must decide whether or 
not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary 
system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either happened or it did not. … If the party who 
bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 is returned and the fact is treated as not 
having happened. If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having 
happened. [Lord Hoffman in Re B 2008 UKHL 35] 
When the law treats something as having happened or not, this does not entail that the evidence 
supports an outright belief that the thing occurred or didn’t occur. Even if the evidence is muddy, a final 
decision must be made to settle the case at hand. It is this burden of deciding that explains why evidence 
law contains standards and burdens of proof. As such, judges and juries do not need to form outright 
beliefs in order to issue verdicts: they need only look at the evidence lead by the party with the burden 
of proof and measure it against the relevant standard of proof (e.g. Jules might have the burden of 
showing, on the balance of probabilities, that he owns the land that Jim’s hedge is growing on). It is 
worth underlining this point because there is an assumption explicit in some defences of doxastic 
approaches (e.g. when Blome-Tillmann writes about a court knowing that the defendant is at fault) and 
implicit in others (e.g. when Littlejohn discusses the role of beliefs in rationalising punishment) that 
legal verdicts are a species—or at least close analogue—of belief.  However, legal judgements and 
beliefs are crucially dissimilar: whilst belief is often thought to be a two-place relation between an 
individual and some proposition, legal judgements involve a three-place relation between an agent (the 
fact-finder: whether in the guise of jury or judge), some proposition (e.g. the civil liability of a 
defendant), and a standard of proof (e.g. the balance of probabilities). The fact-finder in a court is not 
asking whether they believe a proposition simpliciter, but rather deciding whether the evidence supports 
that proposition on a given evidential standard. Meeting this standard may or may not mean that she 
believes the proposition outright.  
Arguments against purely statistical evidence can nonetheless be reframed entirely in terms of 
evidential support. On this approach, critics can say that legal verdicts must be based on evidence that 
could yield knowledge or normically supported belief in an individual. However, this position begs the 
following question: why should we suppose that norms regarding what individuals should do on the 
basis of certain types of evidence will automatically transfer to legal tribunals? After all, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the conditions under which an individual should judge or act might differ 
from when a legal tribunal should judge or act. Of course, both courts and individuals will be governed 
by some norms of epistemic rationality. But we should question whether these norms are identical. For, 
                                                          
29 To be clear: the doxastic views I critique below accept that such an approach is untenable. For instance, 
Littlejohn does not endorse a symmetrical view on which one must either know that a party is guilty or know that 
it is not guilty before judging accordingly—rather, his idea is that we should know the party is guilty before 
judging them guilty, and should exonerate otherwise. Thanks to anonymous referees for pressing me to clarify.   
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if there turn out to be significant differences between the epistemic predicaments of individuals and 
legal tribunals, then extant arguments against legal reliance on bare statistics will miss the mark.   
Recall the fact that legal verdicts are binary. In light of this fact, when it comes to the question of 
how to act—and whether to judge someone responsible for something as a preface to blaming or 
sanctioning them—individuals and courts face different options. One crucial difference is that a legal 
tribunal must decide one way or the other, whilst individuals are able to hedge. Let’s illustrate with an 
example.  
Neighbour. Suppose that you come across a confidential file stating that there is DNA 
evidence linking your new neighbour to a series of sadistic and violent murders. The file 
contains expert testimony stating that DNA material supports a 999,999/1,000,000 chance 
of him having committed these awful crimes.  
Should you believe outright that he is guilty? Well, from the perspective of addressing various 
practical questions, there is a sense in which it is unimportant. After acquiring this evidence, will you 
ask him to babysit your children, to look after your spare key, or perhaps accept his offer to go hiking—
just the two of you—in the backcountry? Certainly not. As an individual with statistical evidence 
indicating the stupendous likelihood that your neighbour is a serial killer, you will adopt various 
prudential policies, rejecting his offer to share a late-night walk through the moors. This is true even on 
the assumption that purely statistical evidence doesn’t license outright/normically 
supported/knowledgeable belief. Even if you only believe <he is extremely likely to be guilty> rather 
than believe that he is guilty outright, you will change your behaviour considerably.30 Moreover, this 
response is perfectly rational—indeed, your partner may rightly criticise you if, for example, you give 
the neighbour the spare key for safe-keeping. This is true, even if everyone concedes, “Of course, we 
don’t know that he’s a killer!” The ability to hedge is very important: to further illustrate, consider that 
many norms relied on by critics of statistical evidence were developed to deal with lottery-cases. 
However, individuals faced with deciding whether or not they have won the lottery are not compelled 
to return a binary verdict of <yes> or <no>. We are not forced to either act as if we have lost and throw 
away the ticket, or act as if we have won and sign up for early retirement. Rather, an individual can 
maintain a hedged belief that they have probably lost—thus rationally licensing them to hold on to the 
ticket but not to rely upon potential winnings in making financial plans. 
Legal tribunals, faced with statistical evidence, are in a rather different epistemic predicament. 
Courts cannot judge that a party is stupendously likely to be guilty: rather, they must issue a judgement 
of guilt or innocence.31 A legal tribunal cannot forbear from ascribing fault and act in a way that reflects 
a high degree of confidence in fault. So, we are owed an argument as to why the epistemic norms 
governing individuals (who can hedge) should result in a legal tribunal (which cannot hedge) 
exonerating a suspect when the evidence is purely statistical. For, even if it is true than an individual 
should believe and act on the proposition <probably p> rather than <p> upon considering bare statistics 
supporting p, this is not an effective argument for supposing that a court should issue and act on the 
judgement <not-p> on the basis of the same evidence. After all, we do think it is rational for individuals 
to treat people differently after gaining statistical evidence about their possible conduct. Legal tribunals 
cannot navigate between extremes by hedging like individuals can, because courts have the burden of 
issuing a decisive verdict. The normative position of a tribunal facing statistical evidence is thoroughly 
different from that of an individual—hence, if you are attempting to explain why a court should not find 
                                                          
30 I put my point in terms of probabilistic belief, but it works equally well in a credence-based framework.  
31 A fascinating exception here is the third verdict in Scottish criminal cases of ‘not proven’. The existence of this 
verdict is deeply controversial from the perspective of criminal law theory, and its abolition has been mooted at 
various points. I won’t take any stance here. In any case, the existence of this third verdict in one legal system 
doesn’t cause trouble for my general point—a ‘not proven’ verdict is functionally identical to a ‘not guilty’ verdict 
insofar as it doesn’t license any additional action by the legal system. 
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someone guilty on the basis of bare statistics, it is not enough to simply appeal to how things stand with 
individuals.  
5. Rehabilitating statistical evidence 
Let’s now make progress on what courts should do in response to purely statistical evidence.  
Although courts must issue a binary verdict, the intuitions behind the puzzle of PSE suggest that it 
isn’t obviously appropriate to simply decide in favour of whatever conclusion has most probabilistic 
support on the evidence. Here’s a first stab at explaining why this is: courts have a very special role in 
doling out criminal and civil penalties, and this role brings with it a host of competing responsibilities. 
Consider a criminal court. If it acts on a high probability that someone is guilty (e.g. by punishing them) 
when they are in fact innocent, then it has wronged that party. Moreover, given the public nature of 
legal judgements, false convictions threaten the credibility of the legal system itself.32 Courts must aim 
to both avoid wronging those they punish and to uphold confidence in the legal system. However, legal 
systems also have duties that can be frustrated by exonerating the accused. If it exonerates a guilty party, 
then the court has failed in its aim of delivering the appropriate response to crime (whether fleshed out 
in terms of protecting society from further criminal activity, deterring crime, giving due retribution, 
providing rehabilitative opportunity, or performing some semiotic function). Hence, courts facing 
purely statistical evidence are in the epistemic predicament of being obliged to issue a binary decision 
where there are unfortunate consequences of getting it wrong in either direction. The norms of legal 
inquiry are encumbered with the delicate task of managing these risks.  
Dealing with the possibility of error in a satisfactory way within the binary framework constraining 
tribunals is a jurisprudential question facing every legal system. In this sense, legal systems cannot only 
be concerned with accuracy. When setting the relevant evidential standards they must also take a stance 
on what type of errors should be minimised at the expense of others. Consider the BRD standard of 
proof. The evidential standards required for criminal conviction must strike a difficult balance. First 
and foremost, legal systems need to avoid falsely convicting the innocent. Indeed, in criminal law 
theory, it is typically thought to be worse to falsely convict the innocent than mistakenly acquit the 
guilty. However, avoiding false convictions is not the only imperative for the criminal law: otherwise 
we would endorse a beyond any doubt standard of proof. Clearly, it is essential to ensure that those who 
are guilty of crimes have an acceptable chance of being convicted. The BRD standard is supposed to 
strike a balance between the desiderata of avoiding false convictions whilst still ensuring that conviction 
for criminal activity is a realistic prospect. That the BRD standard strikes the best balance is far from a 
platitude. For example, Laudan (2006) has suggested—based on the idea that one is more likely to be a 
victim of a recidivist criminal than falsely convicted—that the standard should be weakened. Regardless 
of where the boundary is set, some wrongful convictions and false acquittals are inevitable; the question 
is how to apportion these risks.  
With this in mind, I want to suggest the following about cases involving purely statistical evidence: 
our intuitive discomfort about these cases stems from the fact that such evidence makes the possibility 
of error salient. This makes us reluctant to sanction, because any error would constitute an injustice 
against the sanctioned party. Nonetheless, it is part and parcel of recognising the different 
responsibilities that legal systems have, and the fallibility of legal tribunals, that we tolerate the fact that 
courts will sometimes make errors when discharging the burden of deciding one way or the other. 
Satisficing the different aims of the legal system requires accepting that we will sometimes convict 
people for crimes they did not commit. When confronted with cases that throw this fact into sharp relief 
it naturally makes us uncomfortable, because we are understandably hesitant to explicitly endorse trade-
                                                          
32 Indeed, some (e.g. Thomson 1986; Bolinger forthcoming) point out that legal verdicts resemble assertions. As 
such, we might expect their status as assertions to generate additional norms. I won’t rely on this thought here, 
but this is one way to precisify my argument if you are tempted by the verdict/assertion parallel.  
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offs in which the innocent will foreseeably suffer miscarriages of justice to facilitate justice being done 
elsewhere. However, this balancing act is something that all legal systems must countenance in virtue 
of their unique role in settling disputes. In contrast, the possibility of error is usually much less salient 
when relying on non-statistical evidence. For, when we rely on evidence such as eye-witness testimony, 
it is much easier to construct a psychologically persuasive narrative that obscures the possibility that 
the verdict is mistaken. 
My contention about error-salience chimes with both philosophical speculation and empirical 
evidence. For instance, John Hawthorne (2003: 15-20) suggests that certain scenarios involving 
statistical evidence are structured in such a way as to engender what he calls parity reasoning. Parity 
reasoning occurs when we consider a proposition p against the thought that some particular pi in a set 
of subcases p1,…,pn might not obtain and then realise that our evidence doesn’t speak in favour of any 
particular instance not obtaining over any other particular instance. (Imagine this with respect to lottery-
tickets: the evidence doesn’t privilege any ticket—or ‘subcase’—not losing over any other.) The result 
of parity reasoning is to make the chance of getting things wrong salient; after all, the evidence doesn’t 
privilege the conclusion that any particular pi in the set will not obtain. While ordinary non-statistical 
evidence doesn’t lend itself to being conceptualised in this structured way, lottery cases clearly inspire 
parity reasoning because we naturally just compare our generic ticket to the other generic tickets, each 
with the same chance of winning. I think something similar occurs when there is inculpatory statistical 
evidence. Consider a cold-hit DNA case. When we hear expert testimony asserting “There is a 
1/1,000,000 chance of this DNA belonging to someone else”, I think we are moved to compare our 
current epistemic position with how things would be in other close possible worlds (or subcases), 
including one in which the person was innocent. By making this comparison, we realise that our 
evidence doesn’t privilege any particular subcase and hence the possibility of error (i.e. a false 
conviction) is made very salient. This thought about salience is also supported by work from 
psychologists who have studied the Wells’ effect: for instance, Neidermeier et al. (1999) suggest that 
juror reluctance regarding PSE is explained by the ease of imagining a scenario in which the defendant 
is not at fault. This is all consistent with the empirically well-supported ‘story model’ of decision-
making—a popular paradigm for explaining how juries make decisions in trials—on which legal 
verdicts are made through imposing a linear narrative onto the evidence presented at trial.33 Judgements 
based on bare statistics are not easily subsumed into a psychologically compelling narrative, and PSE 
does not lend itself to inclusion in a story more plausible than an opposing story in which the accused 
was simply absent.  
If something like the salience thought is right, what we should do about our intuitive discomfort with 
PSE? One reaction is to simply disregard our intuitions, favouring PSE because it could bring about 
greater accuracy in the legal system overall. However, I do not think my argument compels us to take 
this position. This is because legal systems prize virtues other than accuracy, as is richly exemplified 
by different canons of evidence law. For example, some rules on evidential admissibility serve broader 
goals not closely tied to maximising accuracy. Consider the exclusion of evidence gained through 
impropriety—what US law calls ‘the fruit of the poisoned tree’—such as where some permission (e.g. 
a search warrant) was needed but not obtained. This evidence is excluded, even if evidence acquired 
through an inappropriate search might be highly reliable in a given case, or indeed highly reliable in 
general. Such rules serve aims such as discouraging inappropriate police conduct but they also serve 
the broader aim of ensuring public confidence in the legal system—an imperative embodied in the 
familiar maxim that ‘justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done’. Evidence law is shot through 
with rules that are not about maximising local accuracy.34 
                                                          
33 See Pennington and Hastie (1994) for an overview and discussion of experimental results.  
34 For other examples, consider rules precluding spouses being compelled to testify against each other; evidence 
gathered through police coercion; and so forth.  
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Let’s now return to the PRISONERS case.  
PRISONERS: 100 prisoners are exercising in the prison yard. 99 of them attack the guard, 
putting into action a plan that the 100th prisoner knew nothing about. The 100th prisoner 
played no role in the assault and could have done nothing to stop it. There is no further 
information that we can use to settle the question of any particular prisoner’s involvement. 
One argument against convicting in PRISONERS that is consistent with all we have said so far is 
the following: guilty verdicts in these types of case would offend certain desiderata of evidence law 
other than maximising accuracy. An obvious candidate is the imperative of maintaining public 
confidence in the legal system. In this sense, simply the fact that there is a salient perception of possible 
injustice in the PRISONERS case could be good enough reason to hold that the evidence is insufficient 
to discharge the evidential burden. This line of thought can be bolstered by observing that the sacrifices 
required by consistently exonerating in cases like PRISONERS are not egregiously costly: cases like 
PRISONERS are relatively rare, excluding such cases would not predictably enable people to escape 
justice for certain types of recurring crime, and—assuming that ‘reasonable doubt’ and a 1/100 
likelihood of innocence aren’t radically divergent standards35—such a rule would not substantially alter 
the global accuracy of the legal system.  
However, the same considerations do not apply across the board. In particular, even if we suppose 
that we can vindicate exoneration in PRISONERS on non-accuracy based grounds, I think we should 
resist this thought regarding (at least some applications of) DNA evidence. Therefore, my argument is 
one in favour of Sometimes rather than Never. Consider the following case fitting the mould of 
prominent uses of PSE in recent years:  
DNA: Someone is sexually assaulted in a secluded park. They are unable to provide an 
informative account of the appearance of the attacker. Their injuries show that there is no 
question that the act was non-consensual. DNA evidence from the crime matches that of 
someone on file for some other reason. A forensic scientist estimates the chance of the DNA 
not belonging to that person to be 1 in one billion.  
I do not think that this type of case creates the same perception of possible injustice as the 
PRISONERS case. One reason for this—whether well-founded or not—is that people tend to have faith 
in the scientific credentials of DNA evidence. This might partly be due to a misconception that the 
inculpatory component of DNA evidence is not merely statistical. However, even if people are directed 
to focus on probabilities alone, there has been empirical evidence suggesting that people are more 
inclined to think that legal verdicts based on PSE are appropriate the higher the probabilities of accuracy 
are (see Wright et al. 1996).36,37 In addition, the sacrifices entailed by consistently exonerating in such 
DNA cases are more costly than a similar policy regarding PRISONERS style scenarios. Firstly, 
cases—particularly sexual offences—where the only incriminating evidence is DNA material are not 
                                                          
35 For instance, surveys of judges on their view of the BRD standard (discussed in Solan 1999) support this 
assumption.  
36 Ebert et al. (2018) found regarding lottery cases that subjects are more likely to ascribe justified belief (but not 
knowledge) when the lottery is much larger—i.e. when the chance of error is much lower. This doesn’t directly 
support any hypothesis about legal cases. However, it does support the thought that PSE suggesting an extremely 
low chance of error will receive a different (and, indeed, a more positive) evaluation than PSE merely suggesting 
a low chance of error.  
37 Bear in mind that an accused can lead exculpatory evidence in their favour: particularly, evidence speaking to 
an alibi. Of course, one might worry that it would be difficult even for an innocent person to overcome such 
formidable inculpatory statistics. But this worry is not particular to DNA evidence, for it is not always the case 
that an innocent person can easily rebut incriminating evidence against them. For instance, if someone is the 
victim of a sustained and skilful attempt to frame them, then various types of evidence (manipulated CCTV, bribed 
witnesses, etc.) will not easily be undermined. This is a consequence of trials being fallible, not a reason to regard 
any class of typically reliable evidence as generally unsatisfactory. 
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particularly rare. Secondly, the lack of non-DNA evidence is a particular problem in prosecuting certain 
types of sexual offence, viz. those carried out by strangers with no particular motive in areas where 
there are unlikely to be eye-witnesses. Ruling DNA evidence to be insufficient would predictably 
undermine our efforts to prosecute a particular type of case, one that already suffers from perennially 
low conviction rates. And finally, a rule against this PSE in the DNA case would upset the global 
balance of accuracy in the legal system: a 1 in one billion chance of innocence is not a remotely 
reasonable approximation of the notion of a reasonable doubt, thus such a rule would lead to many more 
false acquittals than we would expect from allowing courts to use such evidence. So, drawing on these 
different factors as justification, we can still endorse the sufficiency of DNA evidence to undergird 
criminal convictions whilst vindicating the negative intuition about PRISONERS.38  
My discussion focused primarily on criminal cases, but broadly the same points apply to civil cases 
too. The law of evidence regulating civil cases also involves a delicate balancing act. Even though 
criminal sanctions such as imprisonment or the failure to punish crime is not at stake, the issues raised 
are nonetheless of substantial import. Take BLUE BUS style cases involving a harm being suffered by 
one party (i.e. being seriously injured in a bus accident). Evidence law must strike a balance between 
ensuring that people can be compensated for various (often severe) harms that result from the activity 
of others, and ensuring that others are not easily held liable for the these harms erroneously.  To put this 
point in context: either the party who has been struck by a bus receives compensation (e.g. for loss of 
earnings and other expenses incurred as a result of injury) or they are left with nothing.  My own thought 
about BLUE BUS-type cases is that bare statistics could be enough to legitimately result in a finding of 
liability—sometimes it might be reasonable to distribute economic risks in such a way as to fall on a 
company with a predominant market share. Of course, this suggestion is defeasible; e.g. we should not 
take such an approach if it would predictably lead to iniquity for one company over others. However, it 
doesn’t seem necessarily unfair to ascribe civil liability on the basis of statistics simpliciter.39 We can 
press this thought by conceiving of civil cases involving very long odds more akin to DNA cases. For 
instance, imagine a case where there is only one bus company operating in a given locale. If it were the 
case that, say, only 1/10,000 buses on the road is owned by a private individual, then it could be adduced 
as evidence that there is a 99.99% chance of the bus that caused an accident being owned by the 
MONOPOLY BUS COMPANY. Again, I think that a finding of liability here is entirely reasonable. 
However, accepting this contrarian position is not really needed to vindicate Sometimes in the civil 
domain. For, it follows from what I have already argued—namely that criminal convictions can 
sometimes be appropriately based on PSE—that the same holds in the civil domain too. This is because 
many actions that constitute criminal offences—e.g. sexual offences or physical assaults—are also civil 
wrongs. Hence, it is a platitude that if PSE can rightly undergird a criminal conviction on the BRD 
standard then it must also be sufficient to support a finding of civil liability on the weaker BoP standard.  
6. Conclusion  
This paper examined a pressing legal question, namely: how should the courts treat evidence that is 
purely statistical in nature? A growing number of philosophers have suggested that legal systems tend 
to scorn such evidence and provided overarching theories attempting to vindicate this purported truism 
about the law. Against these views, I demonstrated that legal systems do in fact rely on purely statistical 
evidence: DNA profiling is a prominent example. Then I argued that one guiding thought behind many 
critiques of purely statistical evidence, namely that courts should be subject to the same epistemic norms 
as individual inquirers, is unconvincing. This is because courts, unlike individuals, cannot hedge their 
decisions—they must settle matters one way or the other by issuing a decisive verdict. And finally, I 
                                                          
38 There is nothing sui generis about DNA evidence—rather, using PSE raises different issues in different contexts 
and each should be considered on its individual merits against the broader aims of the legal system. 
39 Recall Kaminsky v Hertz in which a Blue Bus style scenario led to a finding of liability. The case explicitly 
considers the unique demands of justice raised by transportation law. This underscores my points: appropriate 
distribution of risk is case-specific, and my piecemeal approach is in keeping with how the common law develops.  
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argued that the best approach to purely statistical evidence takes each case on its merits and illustrated 
that we can sensibly eschew such evidence in the sorts of cases that critics find most uncomfortable, 
but vindicate this evidence in other contexts such as the use of DNA profiling.40   
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